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Abstract
This paper considers a two-period model of market entry with ho-
mogeneous products and switching costs. It is shown that the pro-
competitive eect of a foreign rm's entry (i.e., unilateral trade lib-
eralization) emerges before the entry. Also, conditions that are con-
ducive to a competitive environment in the second-period are shown to
yield a less competitive outcome in the rst-period. That is, when the
marginal cost of the foreign entrant is relatively low, the rst-period
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output of a domestic monopolist is relatively low as well.
Keywords: switching costs, trade liberalization, cost competitiveness
JEL Classications: D43, F12
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1 Introduction
The proliferation of trade liberalization through both economic integration
(e.g., the European Union) and preferential trade agreements (e.g., NAFTA)
has spawned a vast literature on the implications of trade liberalization. In
particular, in a single-period setting, pro-competitive gains from trade due to
foreign rms' entry into the domestic market have been studied extensively.1
It is well known that the entry of a cost-competitive (i.e., low marginal cost)
foreign rm yields a highly competitive outcome. As yet, however, little
attention has been paid to the implications of trade liberalization in the
context of products with switching costs.
In a model with switching costs, it is more costly for consumers (or whole-
salers) to buy from one producer in one period and from another producer
in the next.2 In the context of trade liberalization, switching costs include
transaction and information costs for import wholesalers.3 Important trans-
action costs result from dierences in languages and customs. If a wholesaler
has been buying a good (e.g., steel) from a domestic rm and decides instead
to buy it from a foreign rm, then the wholesaler must hire new person-
1See, for example, Brander (1981), Markusen (1981).
2See Klemperer (1987a, 1987b, 1987c).
3See To (1994) for discussion.
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nel that are familiar with that country's language and customs. Another
transaction cost is that of negotiating a contract or agreement with the new
supplier. Contracting costs with a new foreign supplier are usually higher
than contracting costs with a domestic supplier. Switching costs are thus
an important factor in any industry in which the product passes through a
wholesaler's hands.4
Although the vitality of industries characterized by switching costs is
closely related to trade liberalization, the literature on trade liberalization
is almost exclusively focused on products without switching costs. Since the
role of switching costs is amplied in the globalized world, it seems important
to explore the impact of liberalization in the trade of products with switching
costs.
As its primary contribution, this paper examines how trade liberaliza-
tion (i.e., the entry of a foreign rm into the domestic market) aects the
behavior of a domestic monopolist in the presence of switching costs. For
these purposes I construct a simple two-period market-entrance model with
switching costs. It will be shown that, for the home country, there are always
gains from a foreign rm's entry. It will also be shown that a competitive
environment in the second-period caused by the foreign entrant's relatively
4See Klemperer (1995) for surveys of the relevant literature. For the strategic export
policy context, see To (1994).
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low marginal costs is associated with a less competitive outcome in the rst-
period because the domestic monopolist produces less. The latter result
diers from one obtained in standard single-period models of trade liberal-
ization in that the inclusion of switching costs drastically changes the impact
of trade liberalization.
2 The model
Consider a two-period market-entrance game with homogeneous products
and switching costs. A home rm is present in the domestic market in both
periods, and producing output xt in each period t. A foreign entrant observes
the home rm's rst-period output and enters market in the second-period
with output y2. The rms' products are functionally identical, that is, we as-
sume they are undierentiated except by switching costs. Demand in period
t is ft(q), to be interpreted as the q-th consumer having reservation price
ft(q) for one unit of either rm's product in period t, net of any switching
costs. Each consumer has a `switching cost' s, which we take as given, of
buying either rm's product for the rst time. Products cannot be stored
between periods. We assume no discounting.
We assume Cournot equilibrium in the second-period leading to market
prices p2 and p

2 for the home rm's and the foreign rm's products respec-
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tively. Thus in the second-period
p2 = f2(x2 + y2)  s;
p2 = f2(x2 + y2); if x2  x1;
p2 = f2(x2 + y2)  s; if x2 > x1:
In what follows, to simplify the argument, we assume linear demand curve:
ft(q) = a  bq.
Firms have no xed costs and have constant marginal costs. The home
rm's marginal costs are normalized to zero, while c represents the foreign
rm's marginal costs.
Before moving to trading equilibrium, let us examine the equilibrium
without the foreign rm's entry briey. In this case, the home rm's prot
is represented by  = 1 + 2 = (a   bx1   s)x1 + (a   bx2)x2, where t
represents prots in period-t. We can obtain the equilibrium output as
x1 = x2 =
2a  s
4b
; (1)
where `bar' indicates the equilibrium value without the foreign rm's entry.
Consumer surplus CS = CS1 + CS2, total prots, and welfare are given as
follows:
CS = CS1 + CS2 =
(2a  s)2
16b
; (2)
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 = 1 + 2 =
(2a  s)2
8b
; (3)
W = CS +  =
3(2a  s)2
16b
:
Now, let us move to the case with the foreign rm's entry. In this case,
the analysis is simplied by considering the rm's second-period reaction
curves. We write R(y2) for the home rm's reaction curve if consumers had
no switching costs, and R0(y2) and R(x2) when consumers have a switching
cost s. The heavy line in Figure 1 is the home rm's reaction curve given
x1 > 0. To derive it, we rst recall that for x2  x1, the home rm's
residual demand is f2(x2 + y2), whereas for x2 > x1, the residual demand is
f2(x2 + y2)  s, as if all its consumers had to pay a switching cost s.
The second-period Cournot-Nash equilibrium is at the intersection E.
In this case, a small increase in x1 increases the home rm's second-period
output and decreases the foreign rm's second-period output, that is,
dx2
dx1
> 0;
dy2
dx1
< 0:
Decreasing y2 raises the home rm's second-period residual demand every-
where and so increases the home rm's second-period prots. Therefore, the
home chooses x1 at a higher level than if it simply maximised its long-run
prots ignoring the eect of x1 on y2. In other words, the home rm can
create customer base x1 strategically in order to aect the second-period
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equilibrium.
Considering Figure 1, the second-period equilibrium outputs become as
follows:
x2 = x1; y2 =
a  bx1   c   s
2b
: (4)
The home rm's total prots are
 = 1 +2 = (a  bx1   s)x1 + [a  b(x2 + y2)]x2: (5)
Substitute (4) into (5) and maximising yields the equilibrium output:
~x2 = ~x1 =
3a+ c   s
6b
; (6)
~y2 =
3a  7c   5s
12b
; (7)
where `tilde' indicates the equilibrium value with the foreign rm's entry.
Consumer surplus and total prots are given as follows:
~CS = ~CS1 + ~CS2
=
(3a+ c   s)2
72b
+
(9a  5c   7s)2
288b
=
4(3a+ c   s)2 + (9a  5c   7s)2
288b
; (8)
~ = ~1 + ~2 =
(3a+ c   s)2
24b
: (9)
Since the welfare of the home country is equal to the sum of the consumer
surplus and the prots of the home rm, welfare under the foreign rm's
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entry can be shown to be
~W =
4(3a+ c   s)2 + (9a  5c   7s)2
288b
: (10)
Using (1) and (6), one can obtain the change of the home rm's output
level by the announcement of the foreign rm's entry.
~x1   x1 = 2c
 + s
12b
> 0: (11)
It is important to note that the anticipation of the foreign rm's entry in the
second period increases the home rm's equilibrium output in both periods.
Note that this result occurs because the home rm has a strategic incentive
to create the customer base in order to aect the second-period equilibrium.
Proposition 1: Anticipation of the foreign rm's entry in the second period
increases the home rm's rst-period output level.
In other words, given that there are switching costs, the pro-competitive
eect of the foreign rm's entry (i.e., unilateral trade liberalization) emerges
before the entry. This result seems to reinforce the argument for pro-competitive
gains from trade liberalization, which was emphasized by both Brander
(1981) and Markusen (1981). To see this point precisely, let us consider
welfare changes by the foreign rm's entry. Suppose that c = 0 holds ini-
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tially. In this case, welfare changes can be calculated as follows:
~Wc=0   W = 1
288b
[9(a  s
3
)
2
+ 10s2] > 0: (12)
Also, by dierentiating ~W with respect to c, one can obtain
d ~W
dc
=
(6a+ 82c + 38s)
288b
> 0: (13)
Combining these two conditions, one can state the following proposition on
welfare gains from the foreign rm's entry.
Proposition 2: Given that c > 0 holds, there are always gains from the
foreign rms' entry.
Before closing this section, it is worthwhile to note that the impact of
changes in the foreign rm's marginal costs. Equation (6) implies the inter-
esting impact of trade liberalization in the presence of switching costs.
Proposition 3: As the foreign entrant's marginal costs becomes higher, the
larger the home rm's rst-period output.
In other words, the more cost-competitive the foreign entrant is, the lower
the incentive to capture consumers in the rst-period [i.e., (d~x1=dc
) > 0].
This result diers from those obtained in trade models without switching
costs. In those models, trade with cost-competitive foreign rms makes the
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market more competitive. In this model with switching costs, however, the
promise of competitive market conditions in the future period makes the
current period less competitive. The principle involved is that, since the
motivation to capture consumers in the rst-period is to shift prots away
from the foreign entrant in the second-period, a less-competitive domestic
rm (which has a lower incentive to shift prots) will choose a lower output
level in the rst-period.5
3 Conclusion
In a two-period market-entry model with switching costs, it has been shown
that the anticipation of the foreign rm's entry increases the home country's
welfare. Also, it has been shown that conditions that cause a more competi-
tive environment in the second period (i.e., relatively low marginal costs for
a foreign entrant) yield a less competitive outcome in the rst-period.6 The
interaction between trade liberalization and rm behavior in the presence of
switching costs is crucial: if the magnitude of switching costs is substantial,
some of pro-competitive gains from trade liberalization in the future period
5A related argument can be found in the strategic trade policy literature. See, for
example, Collie and de Meza (2003).
6A similar result is found in the analysis of horizontally dierentiated duopoly with
switching costs. See Kikuchi (2007).
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must be oset by a less-competitive outcome in the current period.
Throughout this paper, we have concentrated on the case of unilateral
trade liberalization: only the foreign rm's entry into the home market was
considered. The model could be enriched with the inclusion of multilateral
trade liberalization: the home rm's entry into the foreign market. Further
research should focus on the comparison of these two cases.7
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